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Redistricting Effect in a Non-Partisan World: Toward a Theory of
Reapportionment at the County Board Level of Government
Abstract
Electoral redistricting shapes political scientists' perceptions of partisan polarization and incumbency.
This paper examines the redistricting process at the county level of government, using the cases of
McLean and Champaign Counties, Illinois. This research analyzes the McLean County board's voting
cleavages in order to highlight considerations of nonpartisan electoral bodies. With Champaign County as
a comparison, it also uses a series of linear regression models to analyze redistricting's effects on county
incumbency and board composition. Redistricting impact proved insignificant, but the study
demonstrates correlations between county electoral composition and state-level electoral trends, and
also confirms the important influence of partisanship on redistricting and electoral outcomes.
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REDISTRICTING EFFECT IN A NONPARTISAN WORLD:
TOWARD A THEORY OF REAPPORTIONMENT AT THE COUNTY BOARD
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
Amy Uden
Abstract: Electoral redistricting shapes political scientists' perceptions of partisan polarization and

incumbency. This paper examines the redistricting process at the county level of government, using the
cases of McLean and Champaign Counties, Illinois. This research analyzes the McLean County board's
voting cleavages in order to highlight considerations of nonpartisan electoral bodies. With Champaign
County as a comparison, it also uses a series of linear regression models to analyze redistricting's effects
on county incumbency and board composition. Redistricting impact proved insignificant, but the study
demonstrates correlations between county electoral composition and state-level electoral trends, and also
confirms the important influence of partisanship on redistricting and electoral outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
In February of 2007, the McLean County Board voted to take a stance regarding a legal
ban of smoking indoors in Illinois, with eleven out of nineteen members voting against a board
declaration of support for the ban. At a time when the issue was a contested topic at the state
level of government, the board members, though not capable of directly impacting the state
legislation's outcome, felt compelled to declare a position. Ideological and personal
considerations undoubtedly played into this vote, which did not split cleanly along party lines,
although the issue had partisan overtones at the state leveL Significantly, such votes often occur
on the McLean County Board, in spite of its reputation as a nonpartisan body. At other
instances in the board's history, members have chosen to take similar stances on everything
from video gaming to terrorism. For an ostensibly nonpartisan body, this behavior raises
questions of a more nuanced background story of board interaction.
County governments receive very little attention from political scientists, and have been
famously acknowledged to be the /I dark continent of political science,"l although perhaps they
deserve more attention than they generally stimulate. Political scientists often perceive county
government as insignificant because of characteristics such as local specificity and
nonpartisanship. Yet why, in a body with allegedly little partisan influence, would board
members feel the need to act in such an ideologically driven fashion? Issue positions like those
taken on the smoking ban could be harmful to board cohesion and personal interaction, and
could also risk alienating state-level legislators whose work controls county intergovernmental
constraints. Under these circumstances, the risks of the situation seem high compared to the
psychological pay-off involved. This anecdote highlights just one instance of interest within
county politics, suggesting the merit of further study in this area.
This study will examine one of the most highly contested issues in political science
within the unusual framework of a county government-that of electoral redistricting. This
research will use cases from central Illinois for an exploratory look at a largely ignored subject.

1

Gilbertson 1917.
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Reapportionment problems touch many aspects of political science, from incumbency to
partisanship. In this exploratory study, the role of partisanship in McLean County Board voting
is examined, as well as the applicability of redistricting theory to county government. A
comparison of McLean County, a body with a reputation for little partisanship, to Champaign
County, a more competitive body, as well as to other findings in the field, could provide a
springboard for further research on the role of these political issues in all levels of government.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is little doubt that electoral redistricting is a hotly contested issue at federal, state,
and local levels of government. Incumbency advantage, district competitiveness, and partisan
competition constitute some of the concerns expressed by scholars and politicians with respect
to redistricting. For purposes of this county government research, the most directly relevant
issues are those of partisan competitiveness. Generally, scholars agree that the institutional
arrangements for redistricting do impact partisan competitiveness.2 Partisan and bipartisan
plans pursue different ends, and deal with the often-competing interests of the party
organization and individual incumbents. No definitive answers exist for these questions of seat
efficiency and polarization. While some perceive redistricting as beneficial to democratic
representativeness and responsiveness, others find that its impact is limited or diminishes over
time.3 Overall, the exhaustive redistricting literature emphasizes the importance of partisan
competition in the reapportionment process, and the redistricting process's well-studied nature
at the national and state levels far eclipses its examination within the context of counties .
Addressing the situation o f county-level redistricting also implies examining urban
rural representation, bringing nonpartisan voting effects to the forefront. Regional voting
patterns tend to be insignificant alongside partisan splits, unless they are somehow
institutionally reinforced.4 Even if a split based on non-partisan characteristics exists for a
legislative body, its impact is less likely to hold up over time without the backing of some
structural trait of the body, such as its electoral districts. At this point, McLean County's
historically limited competitiveness becomes relevant to the discussion. Partisan
competitiveness sparks interest most often when a formerly weak party becomes stronger,
which seems to be the case in McLean County at this time, as two-party competition has only
recently developed. For instance, in the case of post-war Southern realignment, as migration or
social changes caused the growth of the Republican Party, the shift was aided by congressional
redistricting, and incumbents had to adjust representation accordingly.5 Southern realignment
could provide a comparative example for the perceived strengthening of partisan
competitiveness in McLean County. This case's progression of social change and gradual

2 Mann and Cain, eds. 2005; Gelman and King 1994; Jewell 1955.
3 Cain 1985; Squire 1998; Gilligan and Matsuska 1999.
4 Robeck 1970; Broach 1972.
5 Polsby 2004; Sundquist 1983; Shafer and Johnson 2006; Basinger and Ensley 2007.

RES PUBLICA

61

electoral change can provide a springboard story for future research on county
reapportionment.
When measuring partisan competition, scholars look to the attitudes of both candidates
and voters within elections. 6 In state legislatures, parties both provide a default cleavage
structure and help with institutional and ideological organization.7 While that approach
examines electoral impact of partisan competitiveness, party formation and competitiveness
may apply differently at the local level where legislative indicators are not fully developed.
When applying this to county or local party context, past research often stresses both the
importance of a "trickle-up effect" of party, and points out that although variations exist in
county-level party organizations, even without a clear chain of command, local parties
undergird electoral process.8
However, little of the existing research deals with the shape and make-up of partisan
competitiveness within county government. While Beck discusses county demographics in
relation to party, even his work does not explicitly examine county governments.9 This provides
another basis for comparing the constituent make-up and partisan competitiveness of counties.
Although party organization may not be directly tied to the redistricting process in the county,
the connections between these fields of study suggest that vibrant partisan competitiveness has
significant implications in the electoral redistricting process. As more intense competitiveness
arises, the level of partisanship in redistricting will also likely rise. MacManus extends these
studies with a compilation of county make-up survey responses dealing explicitly with board
elections and partisanship. Although she notes a trend toward increased competition reported
in board elections, she also suggests at several points that the effects of term structures and
other generally influential institutional electoral arrangements have received no empirical
testing at this levepo
Intertwining these several different bodies of scholarship will add to the scholarly
conversation by linking these fields to the " dark continent." The county can provide a venue
through which to examine the variance of electoral competition and party development in a
different ideological environment. The states have often been dubbed "laboratories of
democracy" by political scientists, and by similar logic, local governments can bring
experimentation to new levels and throw structure of government into even sharper relief.11
While reviewing the scholarship on redistricting, Theodore Arrington discusses the multiplicity
of issues touched by redistricting questions, including party, race, representativeness, local
boundaries, and decision making in the face of competing criteria.12 Less weighed down in
bureaucratic and federal limitations, local governments can be uniquely situated to embrace

6 Basinger and Ensley 2007.
7 Wright and Schaffner 2002.
8 Frendreis et al. 1990; Dyck, et al. 2009; Eldersveld and Walton 2000.
9 Beck 1974.
10 MacManus 1996.
11 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 1932.
12 Arrington 2010.
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future redistricting questions by implementing different plans and experimenting with new
technologies. Connecting local partisan competition to redistricting politics, along with
applying these principles to the county level of government in both McLean and Champaign
counties, may provide new perspective to our knowledge of electoral redistricting and
partisanship.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
The use of theoretical approaches that examine incumbency and partisan advantage in
conjunction with redistricting has been supported by a wealth of empirical evidence,
particularly at the national level. Most research distinguishes between partisan, bipartisan, and
nonpartisan redistricting processes)3 County governments experience electoral
reapportionment in a similar manner to those at state and national levels of government, yet
application of redistricting theory to counties has seldom occurred. Conversely, normative
theory suggests that, particularly when we emphasize democratic representation, local
governments provide for citizen-government interaction in unique and more direct ways.
Moreover, local context can also indirectly play a significant role at high levels of government,
due to mixed influences such as perceived competition, ideological similarity, and complacency
effects. 14 In addition to partisan representation, constituent-based representation, such as
urban-rural interest splits, can play an important role at this level, though perhaps only if
institutionally reinforced in the county legislative body.ls Therefore, applying redistricting
theory to county governments has potential normative significance. The approach here will be,
to the greatest extent possible, to apply the theoretical frameworks surrounding redistricting to
the county level of government in an exploratory type of study.
Based on this foundation, redistricting will be examined through the implications of
partisan competitiveness, or lack thereof, in the county environment. McLean County is
historically a one-party Republican county, but has experienced a strong trend toward
increased two-part competition over the last generation. Historically, the political divisions in
the county were more likely to be urban-rural than Democratic-Republican. McLean County's
urban-rural divisions are also somewhat similar to the up-state versus down-state split of
Illinois at large. As the county has become more competitive, the county board's "nonpartisan"
reputation has increasingly been called into question. This does not, however, indicate that
Democratic considerations have replaced urban ones on the McLean County Board, because
party lines have not necessarily coincided cleanly with urban and rural areas thus far.
This research also examines Champaign County as a useful electoral comparison and
control. Champaign County and McLean County are similar in size and close in proximity. 16

13 Gelman and King 1994.
14 Dyck 2009.
15 Broach 1972.
16 According to the u.s. Census Bureau's 2009 estimates, Champaign County's population is 195,671, and

McLean County's population is 167,699.
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Both counties have twin-cities at their center, with influential universities, high mobility, and
parallel urban-rural divisions. The county board structures of the two also have similar features,
with relatively large elected bodies and staggered terms. Despite these similarities, Champaign
County has a reputation for being a much more partisan. An examination of the voting margins
for election to the Champaign County Board as compared to those of McLean County provides
empirical evidence supporting this claim (See Figure 1 below) . Since questions of partisanship
play so heavily into redistricting, these two cases supply a controlled comparison of the state of
partisanship within counties.

Figure 1: McLean and Champaign Counties' County Board
Average Margins of Victory, 1980-2009

Electoral Competitiveness in McLean and Champaign County
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Since partisan composition of electoral districts plays such a vital role in the redistricting
process, the existence or lack of existence of partisan competitiveness in the county has key
significance. This solidifies the rationale for examining partisan competitiveness in conjunction
with electoral redistricting in McLean County and other counties. Furthermore, the increasing
population of McLean County, fueled by migration to the twin cities of Bloomington-Normal
may be intensifying two-party competition. It may also be producing higher levels of
partisanship in its elected legislative body. Empirical confirmation for these trends would assist
in applying the standard theories of redistricting to the county level of government. If this is the
case, partisanship could be expected to be the most salient in the politics of redistricting. The
hypotheses will therefore include the following:
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HI: As partisan competition in the county electorate increases, partisan decision-making in the

county board also increases.
H2: As the role of partisan competitiveness in the county board increases, standard electoral

trends accompanying redistricting will also become more evident in the county.
These hypotheses focus primarily on the existence of, or increased growth of, partisan
competitiveness. This phenomenon is not always active at the county level, but plays a strong
role in determining redistricting plans' outcomes and effects. Because of the role of
competitiveness in redistricting theory, its place in McLean County must be established. The
questions concerning redistricting theory are contingent upon this first descriptive aspect of
research concerning the nature of county representation, so only after uncovering this
relationship should the other hypothesis be pursued.

EMPIRICAL MODEL AND FINDINGS: HYPOTHESIS 1
This study uses a number of basic linear regressions to test its theoretical framework. A
very limited level of compiled data exists at the county level of government, so measures had to
be created. For the first hypothesis, the model aims to discover the impact of partisan
competitiveness in the county electorate as a whole on county board decision-making
considerations or cleavages. Board decision-making splits will be measured based on a
comparative group cohesion score, defined as the average percentage of each groups' cohesion
over the percentage of average total board cohesion.17 These cohesion scores were based on
aggregated roll call voting patterns for pairings of individual members across time. Roll call
votes are a standard measure of legislator behavior. Although increasingly less common in
recent years for the McLean County Board, roll call voting occurs at the county level for
controversial or procedurally significant votes. These votes can potentially explain members'

17 To construct these cohesion scores, individual board members' roll call voting histories were initially
established. Then, pairs of individual members were matched up to create member to member cohesion
scores for each pair of members on the board. Cohesion can be described as the number of votes together
out of the total number of votes on which both member voted. Once these scores were compiled, group
averages were calculated, i.e. Republicans voting with Republicans, Democrats voting with Democrats,
and so on. Again, because some board members did not vote in every roll call, either due to absence from
meeting, abstention, appointment to the board mid-year, or (in the case of the chair) procedure, the
cohesion scores for each pair of members come from the percentage of votes " together" out of votes in
which both members voted. Unanimous votes always remain within the set, because although they
elevate the scores slightly, members did have opportunity to vote non-unanimously and chose not to do
so. In the case of some members who voted only on one or two votes in the course of the year, their scores
were outliers that skewed the average. Accordingly, if an individual member votes on less than one third
of the roll call votes, their percentages do not make up a part of the board average scores. One third of the
votes functioned as the threshold because it minimized the number of cases that would be removed while
still accounting for the problem of outliers. However, in order not to haphazardly remove nuance from
the voting patterns, this rule only took effect in situations for which theoretical justification existed, such
as in the case of board chairpersons or members with partial-year terms.

RES PUBLICA

65

actions based on their ideological framework better than any other measure. Using this measure
of the comparative frequency with which members of different groups on the board vote
together will serve as a proxy measure for how important the different considerations of party
and regional interest are to board decision-making. If board members vote together by group
substantially differently from how they vote as an overall body, movement across time or in
comparison to county electorate trends may be revealing about partisan competitiveness and its
role in the board as a legislative body.
Independent variables in the model include the state of Illinois' presidential and
gubernatorial margins (Republican vote minus Democratic vote), McLean County presidential
and gubernatorial models, the change in composition of the county board in the previous
election year, the number of uncontested seats in the previous election year for each party, and
the number of incumbents reelected in the election of the year before the cohesion scores. Each
of these variables demonstrates the strength of partisan competition in the electorate, as
opposed to the existence of an electorate not dominated by only one party or ideological
framework. Furthermore, since this study also attempts to uncover the impact of redistricting
on county boards, it controls for redistricting with a variable indicating the number of years
since the last redistricting process.
The model examines the McLean County Board's roll call voting back to 1982, the year
when the current County Board ten-district structure came into place. Within the data set, each
case covers a two-year time span, including election data from only election years and board
decision-making data from the election year and the following year. This time lag provides a
built-in attempt to gauge the effects of competition in the county at large, measured through
various election results, on the board's decision-making cleavages. Using the two-year span as
the unit of analysis presumably meshes the actual outcome of the various elections with county
board actions. Previous studies on electoral redistricting also examine the impact of redistricting
on incumbent security and partisan composition over an extended period of time, strengthening
the rationale for using two-year intervals as opposed to the one-year intervals common in roll
call analyses.18
In terms of other measures, the presidential and gubernatorial votes measure the
strength of partisan competition in the county as compared to a control of the state for macro
level trends. State-level data serve as the control because factors that impact McLean County
will presumably be more likely to parallel those of impacting Illinois more closely than those at
the national level. Including a variable representing the strength of local parties, such as those
from each party who filed to be precinct committeemen, may also have been beneficial, but the
data for this component were not available.
Changes in board composition also play a large theoretical role in explaining the
variance in the dependent variable. This research tracks board composition as it changes in
election years by measuring the number of Democrats elected out of the total number of

18

Gelman and King 1994.
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available seats, including those for unexpired terms that were up for election. Especially in the
case of McLean County, increasing Democratic presence on the board would suggest a more
competitive body, in a fashion that may parallel the growth of Democratic competition in the
county over time. The number of uncontested seats from each party could work in opposite
directions, as Republican uncontested seats would indicate less competition, but Democratic
uncontested seats may mean the opposite in a generally Republican county context. The
average margin of victory for McLean County Board seats serves as a final indicator of
competition. To measure this margin, Republican percentage of the two-party vote is used. The
average of each Republican candidate's strength across all of the districts shows the electoral
strength, and therefore measures change the same way as the mathematical margin. Greater
margins of victory indicate a less competitive county, and in the model, should be negatively
related to the expected outcome of movement in cohesion scores based on increased party
competitiveness.19 The controls for incumbent reelection and redistricting also attempt to
incorporate redistricting theory, by taking into account the potential for the board to have its
partisan composition influenced by these factors.
As explained above, the models separate the board into Republican, Democratic, rural,
and urban groups, in order to uncover the strength of each of these cleavages as considerations
for board decision-making. More fit in a model indicates that board group cohesion moves in
relation to changes in county partisanship. In other words, increased group cohesion suggests
possible increased prevalence of group association in members' decision-making. The model
tests whether or not movement in board group considerations occur based on the impact of
increased partisanship within the county electorate. Significant results indicate that a group on
the board votes more cohesively with increase of county partisanship.

Practically speaking, the

shape of McLean County's efforts to redistrict in 2011 may be determined by whether or not
urban-rural considerations remain consistent. Therefore, in order to explain which group votes
together most strongly in conjunction with the level of partisan competition in the county, the
model has been run with each group's cohesion scores individually serving as dependent
variables. Results of each model appear as follows:

19

In 1998 for McLean County, and in 2002 for Champaign County, incomplete election records left out
some of the districts. Accordingly, a margin that averages the preceding and following years' election
margins has been created as a substitute measure, in order to preserve all possible cases.
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Table 1: Models of McLean County Partisan Competitiveness and
Average Board Roll Call Vote Cohesion, by Group, 1982-2009

Dependent Variable: McLean County Board Average Group Cohesion Compared to Average Total Cohesion

. .
.
. .
.
.
n g)
(WIth mcreased group coheSlOn suggestmg
POSSI'ble mcreased. preva1ence 0f group assocIation m members' deCIslOn-maki)
.
Independent Variable

Constant

State Presidential Margin

Republican Cohesion

Democratic Cohesion

Rural Cohesion

Urban Cohesion

62.430
(47.428)

4.165
(204.299)

-149.789
(266.206)

137.214
(86.509)

-.614
(.903)

1.323
(3.889)

-1.030
(5.075)

5.830
(1.647)

-2.892**

-.780

(.186)

2.410
(.800)

.220

Margin

(1.045)

(.339)

McLean Presidential

1.092
(.805)

-1.587
(3.467)

.938
(4.524)

-5.426
(1.468)

Margin

3.057**
(.243)

-2.939
(1.048)

-.285
(1.368)

-.429
(.444)

Board Composition
(Percent Democrats

-1.215**
(.214)

.960
(.921)

.365
(1.202)

-1.175
(.390)

McLean Uncontested
Races-Republican

.339
(.145)

-.322
(.625)

-.796
(.816)

-.638
(.265)

McLean Uncontested
Races- Democratic

-.138
(.226)

.315
(.972)

.554
(1.268)

.338
(.412)

-1.132*
(.334)

.342
(1.437)

.753
(1.875)

-1.253
(.608)

McLean Incumbents
Reelected

-.189
(.062)

-.043
(.269)

.551
(.351)

-.202
(.114)

Redistricting Year

-.287
(1.218)

.278
(5.246)

.388
(3.589)

.088
(2.221)

14
.751
4.917

14
.030
1.040

14
-.942
.369

14
-.589
.518

State Gubernatorial

Margin
McLean Gubernatorial

Elected)

McLean County Board
Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

N
Adj. R-squared
F-Test

Note: Standard errors In parentheses; * p �.1, ** P �.05, ***p �.01

Table 1 presents the results for each of these models, although none are statistically
significant overall. Interestingly, the model explains the most for Republican group cohesion
and the least for rural group cohesion. By this logic, rural-urban splits on the board could be
influenced least by changes in the partisan composition of the county. While this may suggest
that these considerations vary less over time in board decision-making, it also may suggest that
urban-rural groupings' importance to the board simply moves inconsistently as compared with
county partisanship. On the other hand, the random variance in cohesion scores based on
member personality, along with the limited number of cases, could be interfering with or
diminishing the effects of any discernible trend. Within the models, some of the variable's
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correlations are significant, but the findings are mixed in terms of their movement in the
direction anticipated. The number of cases limits possibility for significance in these models, as
well as others throughout the study. However, this limited "N" comes from the fact that the
current board structure did not come into place until

1982, so cases before this time would cause

internal inconsistency within the model.
The model for Republican group cohesion on the board had the greatest explanatory
power. When the average margin of victory for board seats increased, meaning that
Republicans were more secure, they voted together less frequently. This suggests that
insecurity, or increased competitiveness, would impact board decision-making along partisan
lines. The significance of this model of increased county competitiveness on Republican voting
cohesion suggests that party may be becoming more important to board process. On the other
hand, as the board becomes more Democratic (Board Composition Change), Republican
cohesion also decreases. Bivariate correlations between the various indicators of partisan
competition and board cohesion measures also present mixed findings. In most cases, cohesion
scores across years waver around a central score, but do not trend in any particular direction.
This creates difficulty in identifying the overall strength of voting cleavages on the board, and
distinguishing partisan or urban-rural considerations from those of particular members' voting
habits and personalities. In McLean County's specific case of redistricting, to rule out
institutionally reinforcing urban and rural considerations in the board decision-making process
may at this point be empirically unsupported.
To clarify some of these models' mixed findings the bivariate relationships between
Board Composition Change, Average Margin of Republican Victory, and each of the cohesion
scores were examined. Interestingly, the only correlation that achieved significance, aside from
those measuring similar phenomena, was that of Democratic Cohesion and Board Composition
Change. Since Board Composition Change measures the increase in the percentage of
Democrats elected to the board, the expected positive correlation

(.458*)

occurred. For this

correlation only to achieve significance among the other measures suggests that Democrats, as
the smallest group on the board, tend to experience the effects of partisan competition the most.
Accordingly, their voting patterns on the board, including their relative tendency to vote
together as a group, move significantly with their strength in the board composition. This
finding has interesting implications for board voting patterns if the board's composition
continues to become more competitive, as predicted.
A graphical representation of two of these group cohesion measures, Republican and
rural, as compared to McLean County's presidential vote margin, displays some of the
ambiguity surrounding groups' cohesion scores. Depicted visually below in Figure I, contrary
to the hypothesis, rural voting patterns have stayed equally cohesive and even discernibly
increased as partisan competition has increased (shown in terms of a decreasing Republican
margin of victory over time). Republican voting cohesion, on the other hand, seems to neither
trend upward nor downward over time, though it may be in the process of increasing slightly.
In spite of statistical insignificance, this trend, at least in McLean County up to the present,
would seem to indicate that partisan decision-making on the board has not necessarily become
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a more salient cleavage even as the partisan competition of the board changes. These findings
emphasize the benefit of maintaining the urban-rural split in McLean County's board, and the
type of decisions faced by board members, concerning issues like zoning, may support this
emphasis.

Figure 1: Republican and Rural Board Members' Average Cohesion and
McLean County Presidential Voting Margins, 1982-2009
Board Group Cohesion Scores and
McLean County Presidential Margin
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Significance issues for all of the data supporting this hypothesis again make it difficult to
draw substantive conclusions. Perhaps, however, this reinforces a different aspect of local
government and partisanship. Because of its face-to-face nature, partisan competitiveness may
have a less overt impact on county government. Alternatively, these measures may not be the
best depiction of the interactions that take place within county government. For instance, more
qualitative or content-based analysis could better represent the influence of different voting
considerations on the county board.
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EMPIRICAL MODELS AND FINDINGS: HYPOTHESIS 2
This study has also hypothesized that in counties with greater partisan competitiveness,
electoral redistricting has a greater impact on county board composition. This model utilizes
variables similar to those that made up the independent variable set in the previous modeL This
portion of the studies deals with the effects of redistricting on various measures of board
security and incumbent advantage. Table

2 presents the data from Champaign County, an

adjacent jurisdiction with a history of much higher partisan competition.
The first regression uses as its dependent variable the composition of the counties'
respective boards, measured in terms of percent of Democrats elected. While this variable does
not measure total board composition because it accounts only for those elected in each election
cycle and county board members have staggered terms, its change from year to year captures
the shape of change in board composition. By looking at this measure first, one can gauge
whether or not redistricting has any influence on board composition at the county leveL
The model's independent variables consist of multiple controls, including state and
county presidential and gubernatorial margins of victory. Controlling for the overall change in
the political or partisan forces impacting the county will allow for any effects of redistricting to
be distinguished from the general pattern of board composition change that might have
occurred even without redistricting. In this model, the logic of including uncontested races has
shifted slightly from that in the first model of this study. Here, uncontested races contribute a
general control for the tone of the board in terms of its normal trend of competition, and
accounts for local electoral patterns in specific districts. The percentage of incumbents reelected
also serves as a control in this situation. Incumbency advantage and redistricting effects are
often tied to one another in the literature. Yet if the counties experience robust incumbency
advantage effects from year to year, their impact would skew the perception of redistricting
effects, and for this reason, incumbency also serves as an independent variable.
Finally, the redistricting variable should, according to the hypothesis, influence the
board composition. As the years since a redistricting process occurs lapse, the redistricting's
effects on board elections should decline. The table below presents the results of this model for
both Champaign County and McLean County:
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Table 2: County Board Redistricting and Board Composition Measure, 1982-2009
Dependent Variable: Board Composition (Percent Democrats Elected)
Champaign County

McLean County

Independent Variable

Constant

State Presidential
Margin

Independent Variable

-37.730
(41.370)
1.192
(1.005)

Constant

83.406
(102.756)

State Presidential
Margin

.740
(2.094)
-.344

State Gubernatorial
Margin

1.021
(.185)

State Gubernatorial
Margin

(.430)

Champaign Presidential
Margin

-.634
(.998)

McLean Presidential
Margin

-.530
(1.872)

Champaign
Gubernatorial Margin

-2.107*
(.366

McLean Gubernatorial
Margin

(.569)

Champaign Uncontested
Races-Republican

-1.224*
(.550)

McLean Uncontested
Races-Republican

-.587
(.308)

Champaign Uncontested
Races- Democratic

2.033**
(.881)

McLean Uncontested
Races- Democratic

.460
(.474)

Champaign County
Board Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

-1.190
(.824)

McLean County Board
Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

-.423
(.730)

Champaign Incumbents
Reelected

.435
(.156)

McLean Incumbents
Reelected

-.102
(.144)

Redistricting Year

.609*
(1.802)

N

14
.744
5.192*

Adj. R-squared
F-Test

Redistricting Year

Note: Standard errors m parentheses; * p ::;.1, ** p ::;.05, ***p ::;.01

-.057

.341
(2.633)
14
.291
1.591

In this model, a positive relationship exists between the lapse in years after redistricting
and change in board composition, although it is only significant for Champaign County. One
feasible explanation hinges on the Republican strength. As more time passes from the
redistricting more Democrats are elected, so perhaps redistricting favors board Republicans. Yet
another possibility is that the relationship between these two variables does not capture
redistricting effects within the right time span or type of measurement. Especially in
Champaign County, where the board is more competitive and composition may be more stable,
a simple measure of board composition change may not reveal the full story of redistricting
effects. Again, the problem of a small sample size surfaces as well, since various races'
individual characteristics may impact board composition more, especially at the county level.
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Because of the ambiguity accompanying an exploratory study such as this, it was

necessary to measure redistricting effects in terms of other dependent variables as well. Board
Composition may only suggest one part of the total impact redistricting has on a county board.
The next model examines the effect of redistricting on incumbent reelection rate. If county
government parallels other governmental bodies, redistricting may be used to make incumbents
safer. Therefore, using incumbent reelection rates as a measure of the impact of redistricting on
the nature of the county board ultimately meshes with the logic of the question. The
construction of the incumbency dependent variable was similar to that used in other studies,
and consists of a percentage of incumbents reelected out of the total number of seats up for
reelection. In some instances, this may not account for the fact that incumbents chose not to run
for reelection. However, eliminating these instances from the possible pool of seats up for
election may remove some of the data's descriptive power because the fact that incumbents
chose not to run for one reason or another could also be an effect of redistricting. Therefore,
retaining the total number of possible seats in which incumbents could have run and won for
the basis of comparison in the variable contributes to its theoretical power to explain. With the
logic of this variable set forth, the findings of the impact of redistricting on incumbent reelection
rates for McLean and Champaign Counties are listed in Table 3 below:
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Table 3: County Board Redistricting and Board Member Security Measures, 1982-2009
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Reelection Rate
McLean County

Champaign County
Independent Variable

Constant

Independent Variable

77.936

Constant

State Presidential
Margin

-1.657
(2.578)

State Gubernatorial
Margin
Champaign Presidential
Margin

147.788
(372.386)

(110.366)
State Presidential

.000

Margin

(7.227)

-1.224
(.534)

State Gubernatorial
Margin

-.940
(1.445)

1.173
(2.487)

McLean Presidential
Margin

.126
(6.442)

Champaign
Gubernatorial Margin

2.659*
(1.056)

McLean Gubernatorial
Margin

.586
(1.931)

Champaign Uncontested
Races-Republican

1.289
(1.884)

Mclean Uncontested
Races-Republican

(1.096)

Champaign Uncontested
Races- Democratic

-1.948
(3.848)

McLean Uncontested
Races- Democratic

(1.804)

Champaign County
Board Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

-1.041
(2.595)

McLean County Board
Average Margin
(Rep. Vote)

-.548
(2.560)

Board Composition
Change (Percentage of

.811
(1.036)

Board Composition
Change (Percentage of

-.261
(1.689)

Democrats Elected)
Redistricting Year

N
Adj. R-squared
F-Test

.744

.077

Democrats Elected)
-.801*
(4.873)

Redistricting Year

-.449
(9.256)

14

14

.522
2.576

-.815
.351

Note: Standard errors m parentheses; * p ::;.1, ** P ::;.05, ***p ::;.01

For McLean County especially, this model has the least explanatory power of any of the
models put forth in this study, and is also not significant. However, this could be more
indicative of a truth about the county level of government than it would appear. In other levels
of government, one would expect measures like redistricting, the composition of a legislature,
and the partisanship of the surrounding district to play a significant role in explaining
incumbency advantage. Interestingly, only in the Champaign model did redistricting play a
statistically significant role in explaining the movement in incumbency reelection rates.
Furthermore, in Champaign County, redistricting did impact incumbency in the expected
direction, since as time since redistricting increased, incumbent advantage decreased. The
findings of this model, therefore support the second hypothesis, although the models achieved
only mixed levels of significance.

74

RES PUBLICA
The final model presented below follows a similar logic in terms of controls to that of the

two preceding models. Here, however, average election margin of county board races serves as
the dependent variable. This shuffling of variables attempts to test the different directionality of
effects on various measures of redistricting effect in order to uncover the most useful way of
examining these questions at this level of government. Cycling dependent variables in this way
allows for more discovery of what measures function best as controls or capture variation the
most. Average Election Mar gin for county board races depicts the level of safety that victors
experience in the election, along with the general competitive nature of the county. This would
estimate redistricting effects on the general competitiveness of the county board races which
would potentially be linked to each county boards' composition in the long run.

Table 4: County Board Redistricting and Board Race Competitiveness Measures, 1982-2009
Dependent Variable: Average County Board Election Margin (Republican Percentage of Two-Party Vote)
McLean County

Champaign County

Independent Variable

Constant

Average Margin

37.623
(7.699)

Independent Variable

Constant

Average Margin

124.039
(34.778)

-.638
(.455)

State Presidential

State Gubernatorial
Margin

-.471
(.097)

State Gubernatorial
Margin

-.322
(.275)

Champaign Presidential

.340
(.449)

McLean Presidential
Margin

-2.618

Margin
Champaign
Gubernatorial Margin

1.167*
(.170)

McLean Gubernatorial
Margin

-.223
(.363)

Champaign Uncontested
Races-Republican

.789***
(.165)

McLean Uncontested
Races-Republican

(.216)

Champaign Uncontested

-1.175**
(.368)

McLean Uncontested
Races- Democratic

(.326)

State Presidential Margin

Races- Democratic

Margin

Board Composition
Change (Percent
Democrats Elected)

.384
(.165)

Board Composition
Change (Percent
Democrats Elected)

Champaign Incumbents
Reelected

-.180
(.078)

McLean Incumbents
Reelected

Redistricting Year

-.309
(.912)

Redistricting Year

N
Adj. R-squared
F-Test

14
.917
17.022***

Note: Standard errors In parentheses; * p ::;;.1, ** P ::;;.05, ***p ::;;.01

3.070
(1.042)

(.967)

.153

-.227

-.291
(.300)

-.147
(.090)
-.294
(1.676)
14
.512
2.516
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The significance of the Champaign County model with average margin as the dependent
variable causes it to stand out from among other models in the study. Problematically, most of
this significance and explanatory power could come from the uncontested seats variables,
which are among the only independent variables also significant in this model. This suggests
that collinearity may also have occurred, discrediting the model. For example, in Champaign
County, these variables most likely move together with the average margin of victory because
there are fewer contested seats, so they pull the average more severely and the movement is
thus more significant. The logic behind retaining the uncontested seat variables, however, was
an attempt to control for local effects, wherein a board member may remain unchallenged for
years because of his or her high name recognition in the community. Alternatively, in McLean
County, even these measures do not have a significant correlation with the dependent variable.
In addition to the uncontested races variables, the Champaign County gubernatorial margin
achieves significance in this model, though the opposite is true for McLean County. The most
plausible explanation here comes from Champaign's more competitive county make-up, which
causes it to move more in line with the pattern of the state.
In this model, redistricting does not have a significant correlation with Republican
electoral strength. Again, this insignificance possibly results from the small number of cases
available here. Theoretically, with a larger number of cases, if a negative correlation were
sustained, it would suggest that as time passes after a redistricting, the gap between Republican
and Democratic electoral strength shrinks. In some ways, this could be opposed to the
hypothesis that redistricting will directly impact board composition by altering the status quo of
electoral districts, potentially improving prospects for change. On the other hand, redistricting
could strengthen the majority party, causing its electoral strength to increase most when the
time lag since redistricting is at its least, so this negative correlation could also have some
theoretical justification.
With models that have so little statistical strength due to their small number of cases, the
overall picture of these findings may be more important than the predictive success of the
individual variables. The fact that greater explanatory power and more instances of significance
occurred in Champaign County models than in McLean County models provides insight into
redistricting theory on a broader level. McLean County's board has been demonstrated by
Hypothesis

1 and Table 1 to be the much less competitive body. Interestingly, it shows less

overall tendency to fit the basic tenants of redistricting theory in political science literature, such
as expected redistricting effects on incumbency, electoral safety, and board composition.
Perhaps redistricting's impact only arises in a more partisan political culture, where electoral
competition provides more of an impetus in the redistricting process. Champaign County's
models' comparatively high levels of explanatory value in some ways confirm the expectation
that McLean County's redistricting issues are much less centered on partisan lines.
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CONCLUSIONS
In spite of statistical significance issues that followed from the data's limited number of

cases, the findings presented in this study fill a gap in the existing literature. Although an
increased number of cases could provide more conclusive statistical evidence, the expectations
of increased partisan strength in county board decision-making in McLean County have thus
far failed to surface. The findings of this study are exploratory and suggest possible patterns in
electoral politics of county redistricting and board members' decision making. For example, the
number of roll call votes taken by the county board decreases dramatically within the sample
time frame from

1982-2009.

As the board increased its reliance on committee structure in

government, its partisanship may not surface in roll call voting as reliably as in previous years.
The discussion of voting cleavages within the McLean County Board would therefore
necessitate further examination, although in general it would seem that increasing partisan
competition has the most correlation with the cohesion of the Republican group of board
members, and the urban-rural group cohesion patterns do not seem to vary in a specific
direction over time. A final note on this segment of the study draws attention also to the
significant bivariate correlation between board composition change and Democratic voting
cohesion, which again may indicate that future increases partisan competition could continue to
impact the strength of party as a mechanism for the formation of voting blocs on the county
board. Because of Republican model strength and the seemingly contradictory picture of
continuing urban-rural group cohesion, I also find it likely that the impact of partisan influence
in McLean County may be increasing, but just as in the case of Southern realignment, may not
yet be fully iterated in the legislative body of the county board.
The models comparing the impact of partisan competition on redistricting trends
suggest that a more competitive partisan county government follows trends of electoral politics
and redistricting more closely than a less partisan body. However, the redistricting process
itself has minimal discernible impact in both communities, at least in terms of measurement
used in this model. Although results were mixed within the models, the McLean County data's
lack of significance in the relationships between standard measures of electoral competition and
board composition, incumbency, and member security all suggest that units of government
with strong two-party competition have more consistent patterns of electoral behavior. This
broad finding may assist public administrators and managers in understanding the principles
behind different redistricting schemes.
A more detailed look at redistricting impact or a comparison of redistricting processes
from county to county could be valuable additions to future research. For instance, covering a
broader range of counties would assist in minimizing the small N issues with the model and
would add greater confidence to the findings of this exploratory study. Furthermore, measuring
redistricting only in terms of time lapsed since the last redistricting process most likely limits
the measure of the impact of this variable. One useful addition would be a measure that
included the impact of the redistricting on different districts and their partisan makeup. This
would require an in-depth examination of individual counties' redistricting processes year by
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year. Again, the impact of having this improved measure would help scholars isolate the impact
of redistricting at the county level.
Other measures could generate more explanatory power about the workings of partisan
competition within county boards themselves. For instance, including committee votes and
action would be relevant in a situation with more cases. Analyzing the use of party as a
decision-making mechanism for board members through a content analysis of divisions on
issues at board meetings could also be insightful. One additional possibility for measuring the
strength of local party organizations would be the percentage of precinct committeemen chairs
filled by parties.
This study strengthens the framework of the literature, applying it to a new level of
government with the suggestion that bodies that are traditionally less partisan experience less
well-defined impact of redistricting and national party -strength trends. In linking the study to
the literature, Broach's ideas of institutional reinforcement of non-partisan divides parallel the
research of this study.20 Interestingly, the conclusions from these models also bolster his claim
that redistricting effects apply more clearly in two-party systems than elsewhere. Even in the
face of insignificant findings, this exploratory study has attempted to lay the groundwork for a
fresh method of applying party development, competition, and redistricting theory to
America's 1/ dark continent." County government directly impacts the lives of citizens in
tangible ways. The role of electoral competition in its operations, although it varies from county
to county, is important for developing an understanding of politics in the most neglected level
of government.

20 Broach 1972.
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